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Economics |
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Some civil UAS applications
seem highly competitive with alternatives. |
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Initial policy ought to be
tailored to the most commercially viable applications. |
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Cost models show that: (i)
costs are most sensitive to hours of utilization; and (ii) safety
equipment has modest cost effect, except for small systems using sense and
avoid. |
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Foreign UAS firms may develop
an advantage if they gain airspace first.
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Risk, Technologies, and Standards |
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For some applications in
specific classes of airspace, UA result in fewer fatalities than manned
aircraft used for the same task. |
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Sense and avoid is important
only in airspace with a significant traffic density. |
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Low risk areas could be used
for experimentation and testing without posing a high risk to those on the
ground or in another aircraft. |
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A mandatory incident reporting
system has the potential to greatly improve both airworthiness and human
factors reliability.
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Public Awareness and Perception |
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All UAS applications on our
survey were considered to be more risky and less beneficial than the
manned alternative. |
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Traffic monitoring was
perceived as the most risky application (likely due to flight over a dense
population). |
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About half of the participants
had heard of UA. |
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Those more familiar with UAS
technology perceive less risk.
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Governance |
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The UA integration problem is
more complex than many people realize. |
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An incremental approach allows
for policy experimentation at low risk (e.g., sparsely populated
areas/airspace). |
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Standards need to be
established to provide a benchmark and incentive for manufacturing. |
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Attention to public perception
and involvement can greatly influence how the UAS issue will unfold. |
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