Practical Implications of Anti-Dilution Protection
Getting real
In recent articles weÕve looked at anti-dilution protection. Recapping:
á An investor in any given round of financing is concerned that the next round could be at a lower price per share than what he is paying this round.
á The investor will insist upon anti-dilution protection.
á
There are two common types of anti-dilution protection:
full ratchet and weighted average.
WeÕve covered the mechanics of anti-dilution protection. Now letÕs look at what it really means.
First we will review
the example transactions. I agreed to invest $400,000 for 40% of your companyÕs
equity. The results of this investment are shown in the following table.
ItÕs time to raise some more money. Unfortunately, the only investment offer you are able to attract is at a lower valuation than the prior round.
á The new investor offers to invest $500,000 for 50% of your company.
á If 50% of the company is worth $500,000, then the pre-financing value of the company is $500,000.
á The $500,000 of pre-financing value is divided among you, my anti-dilution protection, and me.
LetÕs look at how this would play out with the two different types of protection.
As a practical matter, full ratchet anti-dilution protection gives the original investor rights to that number of shares of common stock as if I paid the current roundÕs lower price. The share price must meet the conditions that the new investor gets 50% of the equity and I get my full ratchet anti-dilution protection. Instead of $0.50 per share as might be inferred from the investment offer, the actual share price is $0.1667.
Weighted average anti-dilution protection gives consideration to the relationship between the total shares outstanding as compared to the shares held by the original investor. The formula is CP2 = CP1 * (A+B) / (A+C). These variables were defined in the prior article.
Very simply, a down round happens when you accept an investment at a price per share lower than that paid in a prior round. Notice that the emphasis is on Òyou acceptÉÓ Anyone can offer anything. It only matters if you accept the offer.
Why would you accept such a deal? Most likely because you need the money and you donÕt have any alternatives. How could you find yourself in this position? Some possible reasons include:
á You didnÕt make your sales plan
á You didnÕt complete your product
á Your current investors canÕt invest any more money in your company
á Your current investors could invest more money in your company, but wonÕt
á Potential investors just donÕt Òget itÓ
á YouÕve got too many people
á YouÕve got too few people
á You have the right number of people, but they arenÕt the ÒrightÓ people
á Your business model is flawed
á You donÕt have a business model
á Private equity markets suck and youÕre lucky to get any offer
The fact of the matter is that it doesnÕt really matter why the down round happens.
LetÕs look at the participants in the investment, and their relative positions:
á
You – You still believe in your dream. You are still convinced that youÕve got
a great business opportunity.
Sure, you havenÕt hit plan, but what entrepreneur does? You are willing
to accept a down round if it gives you another time at bat, and
youÕve got enough equity in your company to make it worthwhile.
á Me (the current investor) – Even if you (and your company) have done everything that you ÒshouldÓ have (exceeded plan, built out the management teamÉ), IÕm aware that I am vulnerable if only one next-round investor is at the table.
Knowing this, the primary way to avoid a down round is for the current investor(s) to do an Òinside round,Ó in which the investors (at least the major investors, and quite possibly all investors) in previous rounds take their pro rata shares of an alternative round of financing. As mentioned in previous articles, such inside rounds are usually structured as an extension of the most recent round, or as a convertible note.
If I donÕt step up, I am pretty much at the mercy of the new investor. Yes, IÕve got all sorts of legal protections built into my deal, including anti-dilution protection, but how meaningful are they really?
á The New Investor – He wouldnÕt be looking at the deal unless he thought the fundamental business was promising and that he could achieve a superior rate of return. Of course that rate of return will be greatly impacted by the valuation of the company at the time of his initial investment. Obviously, the lower that value, the better for the new investor. But no matter how low the valuation, if the business doesnÕt have that promise, thereÕs no deal to be done at any price.
OK, so how does the new investor view the other participants?
As far as the new investor is concerned, I donÕt have much to offer. Unless I have agreed to invest a significant amount in the new investorÕs round, he doesnÕt have any incentive to care about me.
You, though, are the jockey heÕs betting on. The new investor has been able to understand how the company has gotten to this point, is willing to Ògive you the benefit of the doubt,Ó and is willing to back you. You are important to him.
With
these dynamics in place, the new investor will want to keep you relatively
happy (under the circumstances) and is likely to dictate terms to me, insisting
that I waive or significantly modify my rights and protective provisions.
If
only one investor is interested in doing the next round, the Golden Rule
prevails – ÒHe who has the gold rules!Ó
Anti-dilution protection will receive particular attention.
o Note that in the case of full ratchet anti-dilution protection, your share of your company will drop from 60% to 10%! This will not be acceptable to the new investor. He wants you to be satisfied by the terms of the deal, and he doesnÕt really care about me. The new investor will demand that I waive my full ratchet anti-dilution protection.
This is likely to be presented as Òtake it, or leave it.Ó If I donÕt agree, the new investor is likely to threaten to walk away from the deal. This is a game of Chicken that IÕm not likely to win.
o With weighted average anti-dilution protection, your share of the company is reduced from 60% to 28%, almost all of which is caused by the valuation decline and not my anti-dilution protection. This level of protection is much more likely to be honored.
The bottom line is that under most circumstances full ratchet anti-dilution protection will be completely waived, while weighted average is likely to be accepted.
Frank Demmler
is Associate Teaching Professor of Entrepreneurship at the Donald H. Jones
Center for Entrepreneurship at the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon
University. Previously he was president & CEO of the Future Fund, general
partner of the Pittsburgh Seed Fund, co-founder & investment advisor to the
Western Pennsylvania Adventure Capital Fund, as well as vice president, venture
development, for The Enterprise Corporation of Pittsburgh. An archive of this
series of articles can be found at my
website.