This course will focus on selected topics in decision theory, game theory, and social choice theory. Some of the specific topics we will address will include: (a) cardinal utility and subjective probability, (b) paradoxes of alternative voting systems, (c) the impossibility theorems of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterwaite, (d) the extensive and the strategic form of noncooperative games, (e) rationalizability and the Nash and correlated equilibrium concepts, (f) the equilibrium selection problem, and (g) public goods and the Prisoners Dilemma. The topics covered in this course constitute part of the branch of social science sometimes called formal theory. To learn this material, we will need to work through a substantial amount of 'definition-theorem-proof' style presentations given in our primary texts. We will also pay special attention to the significance of these topics in formal theory for social philosophy and political science. The course will be run in lecture format, with discussion of assigned readings at eachclass meeting. No prerequisites, but previous coursework in mathematics and philosophy is recommended.
